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In the early morning hours of September 3, 1996, the United
States conducted military strikes against an old foe., Once again United
States guns were discharging upon the nation of Iraq and its obstinate
leader, Saddam Hussein. In addition to striking at Hussein's defenses,
President Bill Clinton extended the already existing no-fly zone south of
the thirty-second parallel to the thirty-third parallel. 2 The strikes were not
only to punish Hussein for his incursion into the northern Kurdish conflict
plaguing Iraq since the end of the Gulf War, but to, "protect the safety of
our aircraft enforcing this [extended] no fly zone." 3
The United States' military strikes were unquestionably unilateral
and stirred unprecedented wavering responses from the international
community, especially, the Gulf War Coalition [hereinafter the Coalition].
Many question the legality of President Clinton's extension of the no-fly.
This comment will examine the illegality of the extension of the southern
no-fly zone in light of United Nations Security Council Resolutions

* B.A., Political Science, 1993, Florida International University, candidate for Juris Doctor,
1998, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. The author would like to thank
his family, and especially Jacqueline Rodriguez, for their support and encouragement.
1. Bradley Graham, U.S. Launches More CruiseMissiles Against Iraq;Air Defenses Near
BaghdadHit; No-Fly Zone Extended in South, WASH. POST, Sept. 4,1996, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Letter Dated 3 September 1996 from the Charge D'Affaires A.1. of the Permanent
Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Presidentof the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1996/711 (1996) [hereinafter Letter dated 3
September 1996].
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[hereinafter Resolutions] as well as offer some counter-arguments that may
provide satisfactory justification for this United States unilateral response
to Hussein's intervention in the northern Kurdish conflict. The first part of
this comment shall address Saddam Hussein's actions after the Gulf War
and the incessant testing of the United States, the United Nations, and the
Coalition's resolve to enforce Resolutions, as well as international law and
recognized international behavior.
The second part will examine at the United States unilateral
response to the Iraqi intervention in the Kurdish civil disturbances in
northern Iraq and the Clinton Administration's reasoning for the extension
of the thirty-second parallel. The third portion will examine the original
creation and imposition of the Iraqi no-fly zones and their probable
illegality, as well as its legal relationship to the current extension by the
Clinton administration. The final portion of the comment will establish the
probable illegality of the current extension, but will present some viable
arguments for its necessity in light of the unprecedented international legal
quandary offered by the current Iraqi conflict.
I.
THE ROAD TO THE PRESENT CONFLICT
Since the end of hostilities in the Gulf War, Iraq has tested the
resolve of both the United Nations and the Coalition. The situation in the
Middle East and Iraq following the cease fire was "far from peaceful. "4
One example is the conflict which arose between the International Atomic
Energy Agency [hereinafter IAEA] and Iraq over nuclear inspections
mandated by Resolution 687.1 Iraq has repeatedly hindered nuclear
weapons inspections conducted by the IAEA. Following the Gulf War, the
IAEA was aware of Iraq's possession of nuclear material that was in a
"readily nuclear-weapons-usable form," or "direct-use material. "6 Due to
the presence of these volatile materials, the United Nations mandated
inspections to ensure that Iraq would not develop weapons of mass
destruction.' From the very beginning, Iraq's compliance was
unsatisfactory. Iraq repeatedly concealed evidence on uranium enrichment
and nuclear weapons development.' It denied access to agency teams and
4. Alan D. Surchin, Terror and the Law: The Unilateral Use of Force and the June 1993
Bombing of Baghdad, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 457, 459 (1995).
5. U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., U. N. AND THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CONFLICT 1990-1996 at
367, U.N. Doc. S/23295, U.N. Sales No.E.96.I.3 (1996).
6. As of December 17, 1991, 400 grams of unirradiated high-enriched uranium remained
in Iraq. Id. at 368.
7. Id. at 367.
8. Id.
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even detained them on one occasion, confiscating their documents. 9 In
addition, Iraq occasionally denied aerial inspections of its territory as
required by the IAEA and Resolution 687.10
By 1992, the Security Council acknowledged Iraq's "lack of
indication of how the government of Iraq intends to comply with the
resolutions of the Council.",, In fact, Iraq had frustrated the Security
Council with "baseless threats, allegations, and attacks launched against
the Security Council by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq.""' As late as
November 1993, Iraq's declarations regarding nuclear materials in its
possession were still incomplete.' 3 Iraq's relationship with the IAEA since
the inspections began was characterized as a "rocky road of
4
cooperation. "'
In June 1993, the United States, acting unilaterally, bombed an
Iraqi Intelligence building in Baghdad in retaliation for an alleged
assassination plot against former President George Bush.'" United States
Intelligence officials had informed President Clinton about the plot, which
allegedly had been masterminded by Saddam Hussein.16 Some, including
Great Britain, found this assassination plot to be a violation of Resolution
687, where Iraq promised an end to Iraqi-sponsored terrorism."
In
addition to such alleged terrorism, Iraq has been evasive in cooperating
with the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in providing
information on the location of missing Kuwaiti nationals resulting from the
invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War itself.'8 In fact, as recently as
December 1995, the General Assembly expressed its concern with major
human rights violations in Iraq by condemning the torture, mutilation,
execution, and disappearances of its own citizens.' 9

9.

Id.

10. Id.
11.

U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 490.

12. Id.
13. Id. at 667.
14. Iraq offered an ultimatum at one point. Early in August 1995, Iraq stated that
.cooperation would cease if no progress was made in the Security Council in the direction of
easing or lifting sanctions and the oil embargo." Id. at 773.
15. David Von Drehle & R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Strikes Iraqfor Plot to Kill Bush, WASH.

POST, June 27, 1993, at Al.
16. Id.

17. Surchin, supra note 4, at 467.
18.

U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 793.

19. Id. at 821.
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Saddam Hussein also challenged the world's military nerves
following the war.? In October of 1994, Iraq conducted military
deployments in the direction of the Kuwait border in violation of paragraph
2 of Resolution 678.2 The United Nations Security Council officially
condemned this action, demanding that Iraq not redeploy troops to the
South or take any other action to enhance its military capacity in southern
Iraq."
This official condemnation of Hussein's troop movements
demonstrated the Council's belief Iraq could still pose a threat to the
region.
The initial concern following the end of hostilities which lead to
the original formation of the no-fly zones was the safety of Iraqi nationals
whom had opposed Saddam Hussein, namely the Kurdish in northern and
southern Iraq. 2 Saddam Hussein began repressing those whom opposed
him during the war which led to a United Nations demand through
Security Council Resolution 688 that the repression end.,, The United
States still contends Saddam Hussein, "shows no signs of complying with
United Nations Security Council Resolution 688."2 This type of noncompliance led the United States and its Coalition partners to establish the
original no-fly zones in June 1991, and in August 1992.26 This type of
non-compliance has also prevented the United Nations from lifting the
embargoes levied against Iraq by Resolution 661 .27
The underlying threat Saddam Hussein presented to the United
States, and at varying times to the Coalition, was Iraq's threat to its
neighbors in the South and consequently, their oil interests2 The United
States believes Hussein's "aggressive military action" constitutes a viable
threat to the flow of oil and the national security of Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
and Saudi Arabia. 29 These interests are the primary reason why the United
20. Id. at 694.
21.

Id.

22. Id.
23.

Bob Deans, Conflict in Iraq: Arab Response, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 4, 1996,

at 6A.
24. Id.
25.

Text of Clinton Letter on Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, U.S. NEWSWIRE,

Nov. 5, 1996.
26.

Iraq Protests to U.N. Over No-Fly Zones, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Sept. 11, 1996.

27. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933rd mtg. & 9(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/661
(1990).
28. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry & Gen. Joseph Ralston, USAF Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, News Briefing and Question and Answer Session, Pentagon (Sept. 3,
1996) <http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink/pubs/di96/dil179.html>.
29. Id.
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States remains and maintains its presence in the Gulf region.
Nevertheless, Hussein's actions in the North have been sufficient to
demand, according to the White House, a strong response? 0
On August 31, 1996, Saddam Hussein sent thirty-thousand Iraqi
troops to assist the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) with the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan in the Kurdish enclave of Irbil.' Consequently, the
KDP overran their rivals in northern Iraq. 32 This Iraqi attack, as the White
House called it, "adds fuel to the factional fire and threatens to spark
instability throughout the region."3 This action resulted in the military
strikes against southern Iraqi defense installations and President Clinton's
extension of the southern no-fly zone from the thirty-second to the thirtythird parallel.3
II. THE UNITED STATES' UNILATERAL RESPONSE
United States officials conceded that the purpose of the September
3 ' attacks on the southern defense radar installations was not to "forcibly
evict the Iraqi army from the north," but to "make it safe for American
and other jets to enforce the new restrictions [no-fly zone]." 3 Any type of
military attacks in the north would have posed too many risks and
dangers.36 The terrain is more mountainous than in the South and would
have prevented a quick and effective strike . By all indications, the true
punishment to Hussein for his incursion into the Kurdish conflict was the
extension of the southern no-fly zone. The action was a broad stroke
attempt to restrict and monitor Hussein in his own territory.
As President Clinton stated in his letter to the United Nations,
"[w]e are extending the no-fly zone in southern Iraq airspace from the
Kuwaiti border to the southern suburbs of Baghdad and significantly
restrict Iraq's ability to conduct offensive operations in the region. "3 The
letter makes no reference to restricting Hussein in the North in a similar
30. Graham, supra note 1.
31. Provocationand Response, ECONOMIST (U.S. ed.), Sept. 7, 1996, at 37.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Graham, supra note 1.
35. John F. Harris & John Mintz, U.S. Warplanes Patrol Wider No-Fly Zone, WASH.
POST, Sept. 5, 1996, at Al.
36. John F. Harris & Bradley Graham, After Quick Response to Iraq, A Lengthy Debate on
Motive; Politics at Home and Abroad Dictated Military Action, Sources Say, WASH. POST, Sept.
8, 1996, at A29.
37. Id.
38. Letter dated 3 September 1996, supra note 3.
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manner and indicates that the Clinton Administration was more concerned
with southern security than protective measures for the Kurdish settlements
in the North.
The extension increases the no-fly zone northward by
approximately 110 kilometers (seventy miles) 9 and curtails Hussein's
military capability in defending Baghdad, advancing towards the South,
and using two major training areas.40 In fact, the United States had even
considered extending a similar restricted zone towards the West, making it
safer for allied aircraft to maneuver between Turkey and Saudi Arabia.4
This plan was abandoned because, as one official said, "one problem with
it was the difficulty we would have explaining it to the public and the
allies. The decision to expand the southern zone was complicated enough
to explain."'
The extension, although denounced by the Iraqi government as a
"flagrant aggression against Iraq's sovereignty and the safety of its
political independence in contravention of United Nations Charter and
norms of international law," abided by the new additional seventy miles of
restricted airspace.4 3 Although the current United States action has served
to control Saddam Hussein further in his quest to reestablish himself
militarily in the South, some argue that the no-fly restrictions imposed
after the Gulf War are most likely illegal" and consequently, so is the
recent extension of the southern zone.

39. Graham, supra note 1.
40. By expanding the southern no fly zone one degree X from the 32nd to the 33rd
parallel, a distance of about seventy miles X officials said Saddarn will be deprived of
two major air force training areas and use of about forty percent of the air defense
capability that existed in the greater Baghdad area. The huge banned area, over half of
Iraq, includes a couple of air bases where the planes have either been moved north or
are presumably grounded.
Id.
41. Harris & Graham, supra note 36.
42. Id.
43. Iraqi helicopters accompanying UN weapons inspectors are providing concrete
proof that Iraq is respecting an expanded no-fly zone which now extends almost to the
Baghdad suburbs, a top UN official said Friday. Rolf Ekeus, the chairman of the UN
Special Commission, told AFP that on Thursday, when he instructed a UN team in
Baghdad to fly for the first time into the new no-fly zone, two Iraqi helicopters
accompanying a UN helicopter had turned sharply to avoid entering the zone.
Iraq Respecting New No-Fly Zone: U.N., AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Sept. 20, 1996.
44. Timothy P. McIlmail, No-Fly Zones: The Imposition and Enforcement of Air Exclusion
Regimes over Bosnia and Iraq, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 35, 83 (1994).
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III. THE ORIGINAL CREATION AND IMPOSITION OF THE No FLYZONES
In June 1991, the Coalition forces, led by the United States,

created a no-fly zone north of the thirty-sixth parallel in Iraq.' In August
1992, a southern no-fly zone was established from the Kuwaiti Border to
the thirty-second parallel. 6 According to the United States Department of
Defense, the "UN authorized the United States to organize a coalition to
conduct Operation Provide Comfort, which enforced a no-fly zone north of
36 degrees, and later authorized Operation Southern Watch, which
enforced a no-fly zone south of 32 degrees." 4 7 However, no United
Nations Security Council Resolution specifically authorized or mandated

any member state to take such actions." In fact, the United Nations
acknowledges the restricted zones only by stating that, "some of the
coalition countries, in what they stated was an effort to enforce and
monitor compliance with resolution 688 (1991), created two no-fly
zones"(emphasis added).49 The report goes on to say that, "[a]ccording to

these coalition countries, the cease fire agreement ending the war
empowered them to impose such controls over Iraqi military flights. "5
Although this demonstrates that the Coalition members are acting on their
own initiative, this language hardly condemns the imposition of the zones.
Alan D. Surchin states in his article titled, Terror and the Law:
The Unilateraluse of Force and the June 1993 Bombing of Baghdad, that
"it is essential that explanations for controversial uses of force be grounded
in law, not expediency."' The explanations provided by the Gulf War
Coalition for the creation of the no-fly zones are based on their
interpretation of several Security Council Resolutions, including
Resolutions 678, 688, 686, and 687.32 However, the justification provided
for the recent United States action seems limited to the enforcement of
3
Resolution 688.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 41.

Id.
Perry & Ralston, supra note 28.
McIlmail, supra note 44, at 49-83.
U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 41.

50. Id.
51. Surchin, supra note 4,at 457.
52. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 50-53.
53. "Saddam Hussein shows no signs of complying with UNSCOR 688, which demands
that Iraq cease the repression of its own people." U.S. NEWSWIRE, supra note 25.
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Article 39 of the United Nation's Charter mandates that the
Security Council, "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and
42 to maintain or restore international peace and security." ' This serves
as a statement by the international community on an event or situation,
"thereby focusing international attention on the event and encouraging the
relevant parties to seek an expeditious resolution.""5 This also, "triggers"
the Security Council's ability to, "pursue enforcement powers under
Chapter VII of the Charter," namely articles 40, 41 and 42 .56 Once such a
determination is made, as it was with Iraq's actions against Kuwait, article
42 permits the Security Council to take adequate actions, "by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security." 57 A member nation, such as the United States, attains its
powers for enforcement of Security Council resolutions from article 49,
which provides that, "[t]he members of the United Nations shall join in
affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by
the Security Council.",,
It seems apparent that the only time a member state may act
unilaterally is under article 51 which states, "[n]othing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace." 9 In this current situation, as with the conditions
following the Gulf War, the United States has not been attacked, nor has
the Security Council mandated a response by member states.
Resolution 688 was adopted to address and abate a "vast
humanitarian calamity" occurring with approximately 1.5 million Iraqi
citizens, mostly Kurds, "fleeing towards and across bleak mountain
borders with Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran."60 The Security
Council, by the powers of the United Nations Charter under article 2,
paragraph VII, identified this problem as a threat to "international peace
54. CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND STUDIES ON KUWAIT, UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN
MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 80, 84 (1995).

55. Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective
Security After the Cold War, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 201, 210 (1994).
56. Id.
57.

CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND STUDIES ON KUWAIT, supra note 54, at 85.

58. Id. at 87.
59. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
60. U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 40.
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and security in the region." 6 Although this resolution exhibits the United
Nation's resolve to condemn and rectify the deteriorating humanitarian
situation in Iraq, it did not create any no-fly zones, nor did it authorize the
United States or any of its Coalition partners to "enforce the demand that
Iraq cease its repression of civilians."62 In its call for action, this
resolution only appeals to the "Member States and to all humanitarian
3
organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts. "
If the Security Council had intended for the Coalition to directly
enforce its resolution, the Council would have surely used its typical
procedures by including in the resolution a "specific invocation of Chapter
VII authority, an authorization of Member State's action, and the use of
the term all necessary means to indicate authority to use force," as it had
in Resolution 678." Although the Security Council's authorization to use
force has been granted infrequently, there are examples of the Council's
use of specific and unambiguous language. In 1950, the Security Council
permitted member states to "furnish such assistance to South Korea as may
be necessary to repel the attack and restore international peace and security
in the area."6 The Council here allows the "necessary" nature of the
actions to be determined by member states, but limits such action to
"repelling the attack" and restoring of peace and security." When the
Security Council passed Resolution 665, it specifically allowed necessary
measures to be taken to enforce the maritime embargo against Iraq, but
limited the permissible action to the enforcement of the embargo, nothing
67
else.
The Security Council has also used such empowering language in
Resolution 836, stating that member states could take, "all necessary
measures, through the use of air power" in the safe havens of BosniaHerzegovina." Here, the language is specific and unambiguous because it
allows measures to be taken, but limits such measures to air power. If the
61. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess. at 1, 2982nd mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/688
(1991).
62. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 50.
63. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 61.
64. Mclimail, supra note 44, at 50.
65. Murphy, supra note 55, citing S.C. Res 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/83 (1950); S.C. Res. 82, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., at 4-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (1950).
66. Id.
67. Alissa Pyrich, United Nations: Authorizations of Use of Force - Security Council
Resolution 665, August 25, 1990 & Security Council Resolution 678, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 270
(1991).
68. S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg. at & 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836
(1993). See also, Murphy, supra note 55, at 232.
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Security Council wished for such force to be used to enforce Resolution
688, there is no reasonable explanation why no specific language was used
to that effect. Therefore, from this narrow interpretation, Resolution 688
does not justify the imposition of the no-fly zones either in northern or
southern Iraq.6 9
The Coalition, when originally imposing these zones, also relied
on Resolution 678 to justify their actions.7 0 Resolution 678 demanded that
Iraq "comply fully with Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant
resolutions" and authorized member states "co-operating with the
Government of Kuwait . . . to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions
and to restore international peace and security in the area. "'1 (emphasis
added). This resolution addresses the restoring of international peace, not
the maintenance of international peace.72 Resolution 660, in addition to
condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, demands that, "Iraq withdraw
immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which
they were located on 1 August 1990. " 11 It can be argued that once the
Iraqis had withdrawn back beyond their own borders, and the threat to
Kuwait was terminated, the objective had been achieved, no further
measures need have been taken within Iraqi territory.
Alternatively, the American government may maintain, and
perhaps legitimately, that the language of Resolution 678, namely, "and all
subsequent relevant resolutions" includes Resolution 688.4
By this
interpretation, Resolution 678 would allow the Coalition, to "use all
necessary means to uphold" Resolution 688.13 At first blush, this seems a
viable reading of the resolutions, but an argument presented by Timothy P.
McIlmail, suggests that "subsequent relevant resolutions" only pertain to
Resolutions adopted "after the invasion of Kuwait" but "prior to the
authorization of force to liberate Kuwait. "76 This would clearly limit the
Coalition's reach in imposing any type of multilateral or, as in the recent
extension of the no-fly zone, unilateral measures to control Saddam
69. McImail, supra note 44, at 50.
70. Id. at 54.
71. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg. at para. 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (1990).
72. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 52.
73.

S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932nd mtg., & 2 U.N. Doc. S/RES/660

(1990).
74.

McIlmail, supra note 44, at 51-2.

75.

Id.

76.

Id.
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Hussein's future actions, unrelated to the invasion and liberation of
Kuwait. A contrary interpretation of the Resolutions would allow the
Coalition to indefinitely impinge upon the sovereignty of a nation merely
based upon their national interests and political motivations.
This is contrary to the Security Council's intent stated in
Resolution 686 as affirming,
the commitment of all member states to the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and Kuwait,
and noting the intention expressed by the Member States
cooperating under paragraph 2 of Security Council 678
(1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end
as soon as possible consistent with achieving the objectives
of the resolution (emphasis added)."
It may also be argued that the objectives of the resolution include,
as it states, "a definitive end to the hostilities," as well as "the need to be
assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions, and the objective in Resolution 678
(1990) of restoring international peace and security in the region. "7 The
integrity of this argument rests heavily upon the question of whether
hostilities in Iraq have truly ended and whether international peace and
security in the region have been restored. Hussein's incessant violation of
certain resolutions may contribute to the theory that security in the region
still has not been established. Therefore, such an argument would contend
that a continued military presence by the United States and the Coalition
forces is not only prudent and justifiable, but within the authority provided
by the United Nations Security Council.
Another possible justification originates from Resolutions 686 and
687."9 Resolution 686 recognized the "suspension of offensive combat
operations," and demanded that Iraq, "implement all 12 relevant Security
Council Resolutions. "' In actuality, this Resolution set the terms for a
formal cease fire and "in effect," created a no-fly zone around Coalition
aircraft while over Iraqi territory."3 But such language cannot be read too
broadly since it is specific as to its purpose.
Another argument of illegality is that "Resolution 686
contemplates the presence of Coalition aircraft in Iraqi airspace," but that
77. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2978th rntg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686
(1990).
78.

Id.

79. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 54.
80.

U.N. DEP'TOF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 182.

81.

Mclimail, supra note 44, at 53.
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this same resolution, "contemplated an end to these activities by offering
Iraq cease fire terms." 8 2 Therefore, as the formal hostilities ended, so
should the restriction on Iraqi aircraft over its own territory. 3 But, again a
valid counter argument is that Resolution 686 authorizes a use by member
states, through its invocation of paragraph 2 of Resolution 678, of "all
necessary means to uphold and implement . . . all subsequent relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area."81
Resolution 686, in Paragraph 3, Section d (4), recognizes that, "during the
period required for Iraq to comply with paragraphs 2 and 3 . . . the
provisions of paragraph 2 of resolution 678 remain valid." ' , Resolution
687 formalizes Resolution 686's terms and could be argued to allow
6
member states to use military force to implement the cease-fire terms.
Resolution 686, therefore, applies Resolution 678's use of force clause
until Iraq complies with Resolution 686. Logically, if the United States
believes that Iraq has yet to comply with both Resolutions 686 and 687,
Resolution 678 would still allow the use of force. Therefore, one could
conclude that as long as Iraq does not comply with any provision of
Resolution 686, Coalition forces may implement all necessary measures to
enforce compliance, as per Resolution 678, which would include no-fly
zones to protect Coalition aircraft.,"
As noted by the United Nations, the Coalition countries believed
that the cease fire agreement ending the war empowered them to impose
no-fly zones over Iraqi military flights to enforce Resolution 688.U The
purpose of Resolution 688 was to address the Kurdish repression in Iraq
and to demand the allowance of humanitarian relief to enter Iraq. 9 The
cease fire resolutions did not address all necessary means to "protect Iraqi
civilians," only the conditions set forth in Resolution 686 and 687.
Although, if one argues that "all relevant subsequent resolutions"
includes Resolution 688, contrary to Timothy P. McIlmail's analysis,9° the
Coalition forces could have the authority under Resolution 678 to impose
the no-fly zones to protect the Kurds. But as Resolution 686 seems to
indicate under Section d(4), paragraph 2 of Resolution 678 is then limited
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 52-53.
Id.
S.C. Res. 686, supra note 77.
Id.
McIlmail, supra note 44, at 54.
Id. at 53-54.
U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 5, at 41.
S.C. Res. 688, supra note 61.
McIlmaii, supra note 44, at 51-52.
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to the time, "during the period required for Iraq to comply with paragraph
2 and 3" of Resolution 686. 9' This argument of legality seems to fail
because, as noted above, the end of the repression of the Kurds was not a
factor in the cease fire agreements and would not be a condition to its
enforcement.9 Iraq's repression of the Kurds does not violate the ceasefire agreements.
By this interpretation, the Coalition forces did not have authority
The only
to impose the no-fly zones to protect Iraqi civilians."
justification allowed would have been the enforcement of the cease fire
Resolution 688 only directs member states to
agreement resolutions.
provide humanitarian assistance to the repressed people of Iraq, not use
military intervention or impose restrictions on Iraqi airspace.95 Resolution
688 alone would not justify the impositions, and the argument that
Resolution 678 allows a blanket use of force and military presence to
enforce Resolution 688 does not seem credible under the language of
Resolution 686. Essentially, as Timothy P. McIlmail states, "[i]f the
Security Council wished to establish a no-fly zone to protect the Kurds, it
could have drafted language to reflect that intent."9 Essentially, there is
very little doubt that the no-fly zones, "had no explicit basis in the
resolutions of the Security Council. "w
The original imposition of the no-fly zones could be legal under
article 106 of the United Nations Charter. 9 Article 106 allows permanent
members of the Security Council, such as the United States, France, and
Great Britain to enforce Security Council decisions if acting in coalition.w
Therefore, once the Security Council determines that a threat to
international peace exists, under article 106, permanent members, "have
independent authority to act and may use armed forces."'1° The article
seems to demand that action under its authority must be joint and only
after consultation with other permanent members.'0 ' The problem and
91. S.C. Res. 686, supra note 77.
92. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991).
93. Mclimail, supra note 44, at 54-55.
94. Id.
95. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 61.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Mcllmail, supra note 44, at 59.
Murphy, supra note 55, at 234.
McIlmail, supra note 44, at 60-62.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
Id.at 61.
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uncertainty about this article 106 argument is that "precise rules governing
the application of article 106 do not yet exist.' °0 Consequently, although
states have never invoked or rejected article 106, it seems probable its use
would only be permissible if the Security Council was incapable of
enforcing its own resolutions under article 42.03 Conversely, since no
rules have been applied it can be argued the article, "permits action
without strict unanimity of purpose among permanent members."' °' By
this latter conclusion, the Coalition can argue that they could impose its
own no-fly zones to enforce Resolution 688, and to "oversee the
maintenance of international peace."' 0
IV. THE PROBABLE ILLEGALITY OF THE EXTENSION
The White House claims the extension of the no-fly zone is
permissible to enforce Resolution 688, which calls for the protection of the
Kurdish areas north and south of Baghdad. By its own admission, the
extension of the no-fly zone was not for the protection of the Kurds, but
for a more stable and sure-footed hold on Saddam Hussein's ability to
strike out at its neighbors.'10 As President Clinton stated,
America's vital interests in the Persian Gulf are constant
and clear: to help protect our friends in the region against
aggression, to work with others in the fight against
terrorism, to preserve the free flow of oil and to build
support for a comprehensive Middle East peace.' °' We
must reduce Iraq's ability to strike out at its neighbors and
we must increase America's ability to contain Iraq over the
long run.'0
Therefore one could conclude that the recent action by the Clinton
Administration is not in pursuance of the enforcement of Resolution 688
and is purely a unilateral action without United Nations support or
mandate. If such action was permissible for the enforcement of the
resolution, Resolution 688 would have contained the words, "all necessary

102. Id. at 62.
103. Id. at 60.
104. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 62.
105. Id.
106. Graham, supra note 1.
107. Nancy Mathis, Clinton Reiterates his Resolve to Keep Saddam in Check, Hous.
CHRON., Sept. 15, 1996, at Al.
108. Letter dated 3 September 1996, supra note 3.
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means, as is customary for United Nations resolutions calling for the use
of force."°0
It is clear that the Kurds were merely a catalyst for military
prudence and strategy in a political feud between the United States and
Saddam Hussein. As Clinton stated, "[n]ow, we control the skies over
Iraq from the border of Kuwait to the southern suburbs of Baghdad. This
action tightened the strategic straightjacket on Hussein, making it harder
for him to threaten Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and easier for us to stop him
if he does."" 0 The United States took the opportunity to place themselves
in a more strategic position to deter future actions by Hussein and
consequently placing themselves in a more favorable position if such action
occurs. The extension was never designed to protect or even address the
Kurds, it was merely designed to keep closer tabs on Hussein. In fact,
"administration members who deal regularly with Iraq had been looking
for an opportunity to implement just such measures.""' As one United
States official stated, "[t]he U.S. is no longer willing to act just around the
periphery of Iraq X in the Kurdish north or the Shiite south . . . We are
now prepared to respond with attacks to the center."" 2 This is clearly a
strategic action which has no United Nations mandate. It deals with
Hussein's "control of his own turf," which to date, no United Nations
Security Council Resolution has directly addressed." Most importantly,
the no-fly zones are created and extended in this case to protect the oil
4
fields of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia."
The Clinton administration does have some legitimate concerns for
the region. Clinton has stated that Hussein is, "in better shape than he was
the day after the Gulf War in 1991.""1 Hussein has maintained a military
presence in the south which consistently poses a threat to Saudi Arabia as
6
well as Kuwait."
In response to questions at a Pentagon press conference, Defense
Secretary William J. Perry admitted that within the last six months or year,
109. Bob Deans, Conflict in Iraq: Arab Response, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 4, 1996, at
6A.
110. Mathis, supra note 107.
111. Graham, supra note 1.
112. Robin Wright, News Analysis; In Hussein's Backyard, a New Line in the Sand, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1996, at Al.
113. Id.
114. OperationDesert Prick, NEW REP., Sept. 30, 1996, at 7.

115. Greg McDonald, Kuwait Balks at U.S. Plans; Arab Allies are Hesitant to Support
Deployments, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 16, 1996, at Al.
116. Perry & Ralston, supra note 28.
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the area between the thirty-second and thirty-third parallel had shown,
"significant training activity."'
In the same news conference, he stated
that, "[e]ven after their defeat in Desert Storm, the Iraqis still have the
largest and most powerful military force in the region.""' With evidence
of heavy training and troop movement around Iraq, the United States
wishes to contain a "theoretical threat" from becoming a "real threat.""'
The President, in his letter to Congress regarding this latest
incident presents perhaps a better attempt at justifying the military
presence in southern Iraq.'1
Clinton cites Security Council Resolution
949, passed in 1994, which "demands that Iraq not threaten its neighbors
or UN operations in Iraq and that it not redeploy or enhance its military
capacity in southern Iraq."''
Although the Security Council expressly
recognizes that any action by Iraq against its neighbors "constitutes a
threat to peace and security in the region," it does not provide authority to
the permanent members to enforce this resolution.122 One argument is,
since the Security Council is recognizing Iraqi military activity near the
Kuwaiti border,23 and since Resolution 949 specifically refers back to
Resolution 687, such action breaches Resolution 687 and subsequently, the
conditions of the cease fire. The United States could have authority under
Resolution 686, by its reference to Resolution 678, to use all means
necessary to enforce the breached cease-fire agreement, which would
justify the extension of a no-fly zone to ensure compliance and abate the
ever growing threat in southern Iraq. This would be a more credible
justification of the extension than the stated reason of enforcing Resolution
688, primarily because Resolution 688 only addresses the repression of
Kurds and does not mandate enforcement of the resolution by member
states.
It should not be mistaken, that although a theoretical threat exists,
the threat is felt most by the United States, as evidenced by the Coalition
response to the extension of the no-fly zone and the military attacks on
defense installations. Great Britain, Germany, Canada, and Japan were
the only Security Council members to offer general support for the United

117. Id.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Text of Clinton Letter on Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, supra note 25.
Id.
S.C. Res. 949, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess. 3438th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/949

(1994).
123. Id.
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States' action. '1' Russia denounced the action while France and Spain felt
the United States "acted too hastily" or "should have sought a political
solution."1"
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov said the
unilateral use of force by any country is absolutely impermissible.'1
France in fact refused to fly into the new expanded zone and would only
do so within the old zone, up to the thirty-second parallel.12 French
Foreign Ministry Officials said, "Saddan may have been within his rights
to send troops to the North. He did nothing illegal." ' However, it is
important to note that France has its own interests in mind, since it stands
to gain a great deal of trade, namely oil, once the limited embargo on Iraqi
oil shipments is lifted.'219
The wavering support by Coalition members, including Saudi
Arabia,30 does prove problematic since most initiatives by the United
Nations seem to require concerted action. This lack of support indicates
that even if the United States would have attempted to attain approval from
the Security Council, permanent members such as Russia and China could
have prevented such action to be mandated. Therefore, the only way in
which the United States and certain Arab interests could be protected, was
for the United States to act unilaterally and forego the arguable costs of
delay that preceded the Gulf War.
124. Graham, supra note 1.

125. Id.
126. John Lancaster & Bradley Graham, Iraq and U.S. Move to Slacken Tensions; Baghdad
to End Missile Firings;Perry to Visit Region, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1996, at Al.
127. Graham, supra note 1.

128. Id.
129. "France hopes to restore long-standing commercial ties with Iraq when United Nations
sanctions eventually are lifted. And Chirac . . . has domestic political considerations -- a large

and sometimes restive Muslim population that might make trouble if it saw a disproportionate or
unjustified attack against a Muslim Arab state." Thomas W. Lippman, France Refuses
ChristopherBidfor Aid in Expanded Iraqi 'No-Fly' Zone, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1996, at A32.
mhey also saw in France's refusal to support America an attempt by Paris to establish
a strong French presence in the Middle East, and a long-term calculation that this
would put France in a good position to win Iraqi oil and trade contracts once the U.N.
sanctions were lifted. With millions of pounds worth of potential deals at stake when
sanctions end, France has emphasized its concern for the territorial integrity of Iraq.
Ben MacIntyre & Michael Binyon, France Refuses to Patrol Widened Iraq No-Fly Zone, THE
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 6517544.
130. An initial attack plan that called for having jet fighters take off from air bases in
Saudi Arabia and Jordan was abandoned, U.S. officials said, after leaders of those
countries made clear to Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. John Shalikashivili and Assistant
Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau . . . that such an operation would cause them
political problems at home.
Graham, supra note 1.
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Essentially, the United States is worried that Hussein will once
again, as recent actions seem to indicate, establish himself militarily and
pose a greater threat to the stability in the Middle East region, and the
crucial supply of oil. In accordance with international law, a nation should
not act unilaterally unless it is defending itself, as proscribed by the United
Nations Charter.'3 ' However, a power such as the United States must at
times consider its own national interests and forgo the costs of delay that a
United Nations response may procure. The lack of response by the
Security Council may be an indication that its purpose of ensuring
international peace and security is failing. A nation, with the resources of
the United States should not jeopardize its national security and overall
interest by waiting without reason for the Security Council to act. As one
commentator stated, "a legal system which merely prohibits the use of
force and does not make adequate provision for the peaceful settlement of
disputes invites failure."' 2 The United States financed the brunt of the
Gulf War and has a consequential interest in preventing a recurrence, even
if it requires the unilateral violation of Iraqi sovereignty in order to contain
this incessant agitator of international peace and civility. United Nations'
actions of "issuing declarations" and the placing of economic sanctions,
"by themselves" have not resolved crisis.'
This may indicate a legitimate concern by the Clinton
Administration that waiting would serve little purpose, but the political
purposes of others, such as the situation with France.'34 It is also important
to note that the United Nations has not condemned the Coalition no-fly
zones,' 3 originally, and in response to this latest extension of the no-fly
zones by the Clinton Administration.
As President Clinton noted,
"historically, the United States takes the lead in such matters. '" 16 As one
commentator stated,
[t]he Iraq-Kuwait situation provided the United Nations
and the United States with an opportunity to posture on
and strengthen the virtues of international law and world
131. John Quigley, Missiles with a Message: The Legality of the United States Raid on
Iraq's Intelligence Headquarters,17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 241, 250 (1994).

132. Surchin, supra note 4, at 459 (citing Sir Humphrey Waldock, The Regulation of the
Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 Recueil des Court 456 (1952 vol. II),
reprinted in International Law 1223-24 (Barry Carter & Phillip Trimble eds., Little, Brown and
Company 1991)).
133. Murphy, supra note 55, at 223
134. Maclntyre & Binyon, supra note 129.
135. MclImail, supra note 44, at 58.
136. Graham, supra note 1.
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order. The seemingly congenial relationship developing
between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as
the unsavory nature of Hussein and his actions, presented
the United States with a prime situation in which to
legitimize international law.'
Such an approach may not only be prudent, but necessary to abate
future threats to international peace in regions such as the Middle East.
V. CONCLUSION
The extension of the southern no-fly zone in Iraq from the thirtysecond to the thirty-third parallel finds little, if any, support in Security
Council Resolutions, especially Resolution 688, which is claimed by the
Clinton Administration to be a justification for the extension. Resolution
688 was drafted and passed to address the treatment of Kurds in Iraq, but
never mandated force or no-fly zones to be used to enforce its demands.
No resolutions expressly address or allows the United States to unilaterally
extend the zones to satisfy its political and military purposes. In fact,
many questions remain as to the legality of the original imposition of the
zones in 1991 and 1992.
Actions pursuant to a lack of direct adherence to United Nations
Resolutions should not be dispositive of the validity of those actions.
Although the extension is seemingly illegal due to its lack of United
Nations authority, policy reasons may justify the original imposition and
the recent extension. Saddam Hussein has proven to be an unpredictable
foe of international peace, and requires treatment more severe than current
international procedures allow.
Despite this departure from strict
adherence to Security Council resolutions, the Security Council and
General Assembly still have not formally condemned the zones and
consequently have indirectly condoned its imposition and enforcement,", as
well as its recent extension.
The necessity of containing Saddam Hussein's military action is
readily apparent and the unilateral actions of a world leader, such as the
United States, may be necessary to effectuate the international peace and
security demanded by the Security Council. Hussein's behavior since the
Gulf War has been provocative and incendiary, demanding unique
responses.
The United Nations must be flexible to address these
unprecedented challenges to the world community. In doing so, it must
137. Thomas YoxalU, Iraq and Article 51: A Correct Use of Limited Authority, 25 INT'L

LAW. 967-68 (1991).
138. McIlmail, supra note 44, at 58.
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allow a broad reading of its resolutions, to allow its permanent members,
either collectively, or individually, to follow through and enforce what the
Council and the member states have defined to be a threat to international
peace and security. President Clinton's extension of the southern no-fly
zone in September of 1996 was technically illegal, but its validity and
necessity is apparent in light of Saddam Hussein's incessant testing of an
international resolve to maintain peace in the Middle East.

